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Abstract 
' 
In a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design'216 Ss' attitudes were measured with 
reference to a "U.S. - Russian Pooling of Resources" issue. 1/2 of the 
Ss then received a high credible source biography wherein the "author of 
the following message" was of excellent reputation and competence. The 
other half read a low credibility source biography. Each of these groups 
.was then further divided such that 1/2 received a message presented in 
syllogistic form which argued for complete pooling of resources. The 
other half in each credibility condition received a similar message 
written, however, in ordinary discursive fashion. Half of the Ss in each 
of these four celis were further asked to write out the conclusions to 
.. ' 
the message they read while for the other 1/2 the conclusions were immediately 
provided. Following this !s were again asked to respond to the attitude 
questionnaires. 
Results, considering the pre- to posttest attitude change scores 
indicate that the syllogistic approach to attitude change is superior 
to the discursive approach providing that there are provisions made 
for reinforcement during the learning session. Differences in 
results as measured by a simple Graphic Rating Scale and the Set11antic 
Differential Scale suggest that the two scales are sensitive to quite 
different attitudinal factors and that the Discursive Communication 
somehow affects a wide range of these factors. The Syllogistic 
Communication, on the other hand, manipulates what is probabily a more 
cognitive component of an attitude. Results are interpreted as 
providing reasonable support for a Reinforcement interpretation of 
attitude change and as providing some negat£ve evidence for a 
Consistency Theory interpretation. 
Chapter I 
Since Thurstone's (1929, 1931, Thurstone & Chave, 1929) early 
work on their measurement, perhaps the greatest impetus for the study 
of attitudes and attitude change was that provided by the Yale Communi-
cations Research Program and culminating in the Reinforcement Theory 
as most concisely set forth in Hovland, Janis, & Kelley's (1953) 
Communication and Persuasion. The work of this group, focussed as 
it was on some of the more relevant external variables involved in 
attitude change, has yielded a lasting empirical framework and metho-
dology to a formerly barren study. Yet a meaningful theoretical inte-
gration of the empirical data generated by this early work was slow in 
coming, and it is only more recently that the social psychologist i.has 
seriously met this need. 
The most prominant current response to a theoretical integration, 
that of Consistency Theory, while providing an exceedingly heuristic 
framework, must nevertheless in the last analysis be considered as 
descriptive as opposed to explanatory. Thus, whether under the guise 
of a tendency towards balance (Heider, 1946, 1958), a dissonance-
reducing drive (Festinger, 1957; Brehm & Cohen, 1962), a need for 
congruity (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1953), or simply a reflection 
of the "homeostatic principle governing all of nature," this group of 
theorists posits some fundamental principle whereby the human psyche 
seeks to maintain a consistent set of orientations towards any given 
stimulus object and between any multiplicity of similar stimulus objects. 
And it is this tendency which allows of attitude change when any one 
of its sub-systems has changed. Little attempt is made by these theorists 
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to explain the process of attitude change with any more fundamental 
analysis than that of a consistency tendency or drive. Learning, 
attention, and acceptance factors (cf. Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) 
are largely ignored, as are personality and situational factors which 
might mitigate or enhance the conditions under which, and the degree 
to which, attitude change will occur. These questions are left to 
others whose interests run more along these lines. Thus, social psycho-
logy is bequeathed with a concept, the validity of which is doubtful, 
to be incorporated wherever it seems suitable or convenient. 
Rei~forcement Theory, providing the brientation for Hovland, 
et al. (1953), has traditionally classified an attitude as a learned 
response to a given set of stimuli (cues). Such learning, of course, 
is contingent upon factors of reinforcement which establish the bonds 
between the cues and opinion responses, the product of which is the 
attitudinal response. Although it is unclear as to the nature of the 
specific reinforcement, or to the motivational basis for such rein-
forcement, it has been proposed by Skinner (1953) that such rein~ 
forcement can be derived from the fact of "being right" or of having 
confirmed the expectations, anticipations and the like which follow 
from one's opinions. Such confirmation provides for secondary rein-
forcement, thus strengthening the cue-response habit known as attitude. 
Counterconnnunications establish competing responses (i.e., those opinions 
expressed by the conununicator) to a similar set of cues (the.same attitude 
object), and the bonds for these cue-response chains are reinforced 
through those factors which generate confirmation for the advocated 
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attitudinal position. Attitude change occurs when these new fionds 
exceed the strength of the originally-held cue-opinion bonds. 
Since attitude change results through a superior summated or 
averaged (the function is not made clear) bond strength of all those 
counterattitudinal opinions which are responses to the same ~ttitude 
object, it is the task of Reinforcement Theory to specify how it occurs 
that the attitude will change when the cue-opinion responses have 
changed. As Insko (1967) puts it, " ••• if it is asserted that opinion-
mediated attitude change is a result of quasi-logical considerations, 
then to what extent is a strictly reinforcement interpretation being 
forsaken for a consistency point of,.view." It is the purpose of this 
paper to explore the learning process by which attitudes are changed, 
within a strictly Reinforcement orientation, by experimentally investi-
gating two of those variables assumed to be crucial to the learning 
process, and by introducing a third variable which, while not necessarily 
related to learning per se, is somehow related to the acceptance of 
what has been learned. 
Jones and Gerard tl967) present a paradigm for conceptualizing 
attitudes which, while not violating the fundamentals of Reinforcement 
Theory, does provide the departure for, but not an answer to, a possible 
escape from the Reinforcement + Consistency .(cf. Insko, 1967) concession. 
Hovland et al. (1953) imply that an attitude is something other 
than a system of cue-opinion bonds, yet enjoys only the strength and 
direction of those bonds. It may be said that cognitions give rise to 
opinions and these opinions are the base stuff of which attitudes are 
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formed. But an attitude is something different, else it would neces-
sarily change with opinion change. Jones and Gerard, however, conceive 
of an attitude 'as nothing more than a conclusion to a set of beliefs 
and values. Thus, EY. definition, if any belief or value changes, so 
also must the attitude. Avoiding for the moment a bow to Consistency 
Theory, then, the task is to examine belief and value change from which 
attitude change necessarily must follow. 
Following a Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1957) approach, given the 
total set of stimuli (cognitions) manifested by an object, a cognitive 
category is in the first instance tentatively defined as· that which 
specifies which of those cues are r·~levant (i.e., define the object) 
and which are irrelevant. The category is, then, a system of cognitions, 
a cognitive system. However, cognitive categories do not exist in 
isolation from one another, but rather are, through experience (i.e., 
learning), found to be to a greater or lesser extent associated with 
one another. Jones and Gerard term this type of association a belief. 
Thus the phrase "Lemons are yellow" is simply the singling out of one 
of the relevant (i.e., defining) cues from the category "lemon," and 
expressing this. However, the phrase "Lemons go well with fish" is not 
necessarily the expression of a category as previously defined, since 
neither "lemon" nor "goes well with fish" defines the other. Rather, 
this is tje expression of a belie.f--the association of two categories 
when neither defines the other. Thus, the individual has found that, 
at least within the realm of his own experience, "lemon" and "goes well 
with fish" are often associated with one another, and thus he believes 
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that "lemons go well with fish." 
In addition to cognitions (cues), categories and beliefs Jones 
and Gerard define the concept of value as an association between a 
category and an emotional feeling. Thus, while the expression "lemons 
go well with fish" would be the expression of a belief, "What goes 
well with fish is good" would be the expression of a value. 
Now. it was previously stated that an attitude is the conclusion 
drawn from a set of beliefs and values. More specifically, however, an 
attitude is formally def~ned by Jones and Gerard, as the conclusion drawn 
from a syllogism containing one belief premise•and one value premise. 
Thus, given the belief: _ Lemons go well with fish 
and the value: What goes well with fish is good 
the conclusion: Lemons are good 
must necessarily be drawn. This conclusion, then, is the attitude 
towards lemons for the individual accepting both the belief and the 
value premise. 
Since an attitude is for Jones and Gerard nothing more than the 
conclusion to a belief (cognitive) and a value (affect) premise, if either 
changes so also must the attitude change. It needs to be emphasized, 
however, that it is~ virtue of definition alone that this.paradigm 
seems to be other than a rephrasing of Consistency Theory. Upon 
closer inspection,however, what is being said is that attitude change is 
not a consequence of any balance tendency, but rather, that the phenomenon 
of a balance tendency is simply a consequence of the nature of an 
attitude, but only as defined by Jones and Gerard. And just as-a strictly 
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Reinforcement interpretation seems to have been forsaken for a Consistency 
point of view (cf. Insko, 1967), so also is the Jones and Gerard vulnerable 
to a comparable cricitism. For, again, it is solely by definition 
of an attitude as a syllogistic conclusion that the Jones-Gerard 
paradigm escapes classification as a Consistency Theory. 
Furthermore it seems that this model is more appropriate from a 
post hoc than from a predictive point of view. Thus, given a person's 
attitude, it should be.possible, on the basis of skillful interviewing 
techniques, to construct those syllogistic premises which lead to the 
conclusion. (attitude) •. And since an attitude need not simply be the 
conclusion to one syllogism, but ma~ be the conclusion to a chain of 
interrelated syllogisms (i.e., the vertical structure) it should be 
theoretically possible to discover this entire·vertical structure of 
an attitude. Likewise, on the assumption that a given attitude is the 
result of several or more chains of syllogisms, it should be possible 
to discover this horizontal structure as well. 
'I<. trace back from conclusions to premises is one thing. However, 
to proceed from premises to conclusions is a more difficult task, for 
there is no assurance that an individual will accept the premises. 
Finally, Jones and Gerard assume that the correct conclusion will 
be accepted when drawn, an assumption which, in light of research in 
defensive processes, seems unwarranted. Thus, a refinement of the model 
is needed to explain the conditions under which premise and conclusion 
will be accepted, and furthermore, to specify the degree of this accep-
tance (i.e., the degree of attitude change that will take place). 
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Thus far, in summary, it has been indicated that while Consistency 
Theory attempts to provide a theoretical integration of attitude change 
research it largely ignores many of those factors which.Reinforcement 
Theory has shown to be relevant to the attitude change process. 
Furthermore, it was noted that Consistency Theory merely posits an 
unproven assumption to explain the process and is, in the last analysis, 
descriptive as opposed to analytic. Yet Reinforcement Theory, itself, 
is subject to criticism since it has not made clear how it is that an 
attitude will change when the cue-opinion bonds have changed, and it is 
the purpose of this paper to explore this question more fully. 
The Jones and G~rard paradigm procides the starting point for 
this investigation by providing a framework within wmich attitudes can 
be conceptµalized. Yet it was noted that their approach rests solely on 
its narrow definition of an attitude and furthermore that its value lay 
more in a post.hoc understanding than a predictive analysis. Thus, 
while retaining the Jones and Gerard paradig~ for organizational pur-
poses the theoretical orientation of this paper is on a Reinforcement 
interpretation of attitude change. 
According to Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, attitude change is 
contingent upon three factors: a) attention to the counterattitudinal 
communication; b) comprehension of the position advocated; and c) 
acceptance of this position. The first two factors can easily be 
' 
collapsed into a general learning ~actor and will be considered as such 
throughout this paper. Thus, attitude change is directly related to 
a) the learning of the communication, and b) the acceptance of this 
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communication. 
According to Skinner, that factor which is most important for 
learning to occur is reinforcement contingent to the performance of a 
correct response. Thus, given that an individual has made a response 
to a given set of stimuli, if that response is acknowledged as "Correct" 
the result is reinforcement to the indiv.idual and an increased likli-
hood that that response will again be made to a similar set of stimuli 
on a subsequent occasion., A second factor which he says will maximize 
learning is the judicious arrangement of stimuli (cues) designed to 
elicit the desired learning response. Thus, through the careful arrange-
ment of stimuli one is able to increase the probability of a correct 
response being elicited. The purpose of a stimulus program, then, 
is twofold: a) the maximization of the opportunity for reinforcement 
to the individual at each step in the learning process, in order to 
maximize the occurance of reinforcement during the learning process; and 
b) the minimization of the abruptness of these learning steps involved 
in progressing through the learning session (i.e., gradualness), in 
order to maximize the probability of eliciting the correct learning 
response. 
The logical syllogism is, according to Skinner, a way of arranging 
stimuli such that there is a maximum liklihood of the desired response 
being elicited. Furthermore, the vertical structure of a series of 
related syllogisms can be regarded as nothing more than a program leading 
to the final (advocated attitudinal position) learning response, and thu~, 
maximizes the probability of eliciting that desired learning response. 
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secondly, the conclusion to each syllogism (learning step) in this 
learning program provides a logical opportunity for reinforcement during 
the learning session and ,provides as many opportunities for this rein-
forcement as there are syllogisms in the program. A syllogistic 
program, then, can be interpreted as an extremely efficient program 
leading to the learning of the desired c9unterattitudinal position. 
A discursive argument can also be viewed as a program leading 
to the elicitation of the desired learning response. In the interests 
of "correct" literary. format and of holding the interest of the reader, 
however, there is less emphasis ~n rigid adherence to the mechanics of 
formal logic. Thus, argument premises may be presented out of logical 
order or as "diluted" through the addition of irrelevant (from a logical 
point of view) terms and connecting phrases. Conclusions need not follow 
immediately after the presentation of premises and may, in fact, be stated 
several or more paragraphs later, thus losing their impact as necessary 
conclusions in the interests of literary appeal or dramatic impact. 
Furthermore, because a discursive communication can be reduced 
only to the paragraph level without interrupting an integral train of 
thought there are only as many opportunities for the drawing of meaningful 
conclusions as there are well-constructed paragraphs. And even these 
opportunities may be somewhat arbitrary and random since an integral 
thought-pattern may be at other times considered as small as the sentence 
or even the word, or, as large as the communication itself. Yet to 
arbitrarily interject conclusion-drawing requirements in such a manner 
may only serve to confuse the reader or to lead him astray since the 
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premises necessary for correct conclusion-drawing may have occurred 
several sentences or paragraphs earlier, or may not even have been 
presented as yet. Thus, it is highly likely that a discursive program 
is neither so carefully constructed n0r as efficient in providing for the 
administration of reinforcement as contingent upon conclusion-drawing 
during the learning sess~on. It follows, then, that the syllogistic 
program will be superior to the discursive program in maximizing the 
learning of the counterattitudinal communication. 
Since it is not only the judicious arrangement of stimuli ( 
syllogistic versus discursive) that contributes to the learning of the 
correct response, but even more impoctantly, the amount of reinforcement 
provided during the learning session, it follows that if this reinforcement 
schedule is reduced so also will, be the consequent learning. Since Skinner 
interprets the confirmation of the elicited response as "Correct" as 
the reinforcement for that response such reinforcement requires that the 
response be made before the reinforcement can occur. This is to say, 
then, that the individual must draw his own conclusion, before it is 
presented to him in the program, if the syllogistic program superiority 
as a function of reinforcement contingencies, is to obtain. Likewise, 
for such reinforcement to obtain in the discursive program the subject 
must also draw his conclusions before they are presented by the program. 
However, as has already been indicated, the opportunity for correct 
conclusion-drawing is greater with the syllogistic program, thus giving 
it its superiority over the discursive program. If Skinner is correct, then, 
when the opportunity for the individual to draw his own conclusions is 
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absent the superiority of the syllogistic over the discursive program 
will rest only on the more judicious arrangement of stimuli; thus the 
superiority will be greatly reduced. 
Finally, .once a counterattitudinal communication has been learned 
it is further necessary that this position oe accepted in order for 
attitude change to actually obtain. Yet this acceptance is largely 
dependent upon two broadly defined classes of variables. The first of 
these is the intrinsic value of the communication itself. If the 
communication is sufficiently compelling, i.e., if the conclusions t~ 
the to the communication are seen as following necessarily from the 
arguments used and if these argumenos have a certain face validity·, 
then communication acceptance is likely to follow. If, however, the 
communication itself.is substandard, or if the reader is not aware that 
the conclusions ilrawn are necessary conclusions oecause of a confusing 
(from a strictly logical point of view) communi.cation, then i.t is likely 
that acceptance will rely on variables extrnsic to the communication, 
e.g., source considerations. 
Now a syllogistic program has both a well-defined horizontal 
structjre (number of syllogistic chains· in the program}_, and a well-
defined tightly knit vertical structure (i.e., each syllogistic cliain 
itself). Providing that the arguments have a certain face validity, 
then the conclusions following from those arguments are recognized as 
necessary, and thus acceptance is greatly facilitated. A discursive 
communication, on the other hand, has a 
well-defined horizontal structure 
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(operationally defined as the number of different arguments used in 
the communication) but a poorly defined vertical structure. Each 
argument is usually not laid out in as· tight a fashion as in a syllo-
gistic chain. Thus conclusions are less likely to be seen as necessary 
and there will be a greater dependence on external variables such as 
source credibility for acceptance to occur. 
On the basis of the preceeding discussion, then, the hypotheses 
of this study are: 
1. A Syllogistic program provides for greater attitude change then does 
a Discursive program. 
2. Conclusion-Drawing by subjects results in greater attitude change than 
if subjects are not asked to draw their own conclusions. 
3. High Source Credibility results in greater attitude change than low 
Source Credibility. 
4. An interaction is predicted between Programs and Conclusion-Drawing 
such that the superiority of Syllogistic over Discursive programs is 
significantly d·iminished in those conditions where subjects are not 
asked to draw their own conclusions. 
5. There is predicted a Program x Credibility interaction such that 
the Source Credibility manipulation has less influence on attitude 
change induced through the Syllogistic Program than it will have in 
the Discursive conditions. 
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Chapter II 
Method 
This experiment followed a 2 x f x 2 factorial design considering 
the variables: 
a) Program: Syllogistic (S) versus Discursive (D) 
b) Source Credibility: High (HC) versus Low (LC) 
c) Conclusion-Drawing: Self-Drawn (SD) versus Other-Drawn (OD) 
216 male and female ~s from the firth through third year college classes 
were tested during their regular summer school class periods. Each S 
was asked to indicate his attitude t;.owards a "U.S. - Russian Pooling of 
Resources" issue by responding to two different attitude rating scales. 
The first of these was a one-item, 100-point Graphic Rating Scale (GRS) 
designed by McGuire (1960) on which ~s were asked to evaluate the 
probability of the truth of a statement which was strongly in favor of 
a complete pooling of resources and talents (Appendix I)~ As a secondary 
measure an abridged (18-item, 126-point) Semantic Differential Scale 
(SDS) was also used. All items on this scale were selected for their 
high h2 (proportion of total factor v~riance accounted for) value, 
seven from the".-ev.alaativ.e dimension, four from the potency dimension, 
and one each from the oriented activity, tautness·,. novelty, recepti.vi.ty, 
and aggressiveness dimensions as originally conceived by Osgood, 
Suci, and Tannenbaum (1958), (Appendix II). The Graphic Rating Scale 
was selected because it is a general attitudinal meas.uring device designed 
to evaluate basic changes in ·attitudinal position as a function of 
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persuasion: The Semantic Differential Scale, on the other hand, was 
selected for its selectivity to those factors specifically related to 
affective change only. 
Source Manipulation. Following this Ss read 'a short biography intro-
ducing either an extremely expert and trustworthy Ph.D. in the field 
of aerospace research (HC), (Appendix III), or an extremely shady 
teenager in a high school correctional institution (LC), (Appendix IV). 
These biographies also indicated that Ss would later read a communi-
catiorr written by the individual whose biography they had just read. 
After reading the biography §_s ~ere asked to indicate how 
expert and honest they considered t'f\e source to be as based on the infor-
mation they had received in the biography. Each of these two dimensions 
was measured by subject-responses to an 11-point graphic scale ranging 
from "No Expertness" (or "lionesty") at position "O" through"Complete 
Expertness"(or "Honesty") at the 11th position (Appendix V). 
Program Manipulation. One-half of the Ss in each Credibility condition 
were then presented with a series of 9 interrelated syllogisms of the 
type: A leads to B 
B leads to C 
A leads to C 
B leads to C 
C leads to C 
B ,leads to D 
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C leads to D 
D leads to E . . • etc., such that the final conclusion to each 
of the two syllogistic lines of argument (5 syllogisms for the first 
argument, 4 for the second) was that the United States and Russia 
should pool all of their resourses and talents in space exploration. 
For example: 
The highest purpose in life for man is the full realization of 
his human potential 
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's 
understanding of his role in the Universe 
Therefore: the highest purp~se in life for man lies in his 
understanding of his role in the Universe. 
These syllogisms are presented in Appendices VI and VII. 
For those Ss in the Discursive condition the two lines of 
argument as used in the Syllogistic communication were presented in 
an ordinary discursive fashion with correct sentence structure, syntax, 
etc., (Appendices VIII and IX). No attempt was made to keep the length 
of the two types of Programs equal although all major, minor and middle 
terms in the Syllogistic Communication were used an equal number of 
times in the Discursive Communication. 
Conclusion-Drawing Manipulation. One-half. of the Ss in each of these 
four Credibility x Program cells were asked to write out the conclusion 
to each of the syllogisms or discursive arguments based upon the argument 
premises. For these Self-Drawn treatments the premises were presented 
on one page up to the point where a conclusion could be drawn. At this 
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point space was provided and ~s were asked to write in the correct 
conclusion to those premises. Ss were then asked to turn to the following 
page upon which the correct conclusion was printed. The page following 
this contained another set of premises with space provided for writing 
in conclusions, and so on, until the entire message had been presented 
(Appendices VI and VIII). Because the Syllogistic co~dition requires 
considerably more writing since there were a total of 9 syllogisms 
used (i.e., 9 sets of premises from·which conclusions could be drawn 
versus two for the Discursive treatments), those ~sin the Discursive 
cells were also asked to write a short summary of the major arguments 
in addition to the conclusions to control for total amount of writing 
• 
required (Appendix VIII). Finally, for those ~sin the Other-Drawn 
cells the conclusions to the premises followed immediately from those 
premises. Ss were not asked to draw the conclusions first (Appendices 
VII and IX). 
Following this Ss were asked to again respond to the two attitude 
rating scales. They were then told the general nature of the study 
and dismissed. 
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Chapter III 
Results 
Two different scales were used to measure attitudes towards 
the "U.S. - Russian Pooling of Resources" issue. The first and 
primary measure was a one-item, 100-point Graphic Rating Scale as used 
by McGuire (1960). As a secondary measure, an abridged 18-item 
Osgood Semantic Differential Scale was also used. Since each item 
on this scale is checked on a seven-point scale there is a 126-point 
maximum score. The dependent measure being considered in this study 
is the pre- to posttest change in s06le ratings for each S. A 2 x 2 x 2 
analysis of variance was performed considering each of the two scales 
separately. 
Graphic Rating Scale. Table 1 presents the means and standard devia-
tions of the pre- and posttest attitude ratings for each of the eight 
cells of this study. 
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Table 1 
Graphic rating scale 
Pre- and posttest means and standard deviations 
Pre Post 
Hi-Cred x 74. 30 85.15 SD 23.09 18.88 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 72. 30 82.70 SD 22.26 16.95 
Syllogistic 
Hi-Cred x 66.67 .71. 78 
·SD 29.09 28.32 
Author-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 59. 70 61.85 
.. 
SD 26.41 26.88 
Hi-Cred x 60.63 70.52 SD 29. 72 26.61 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 79.04 80.63 II SD 22.66 22.22 
Discursive 
Hi-Cred x 67.33 71.11 
c ·-" SD 27.95 29.06 
Author-Drawn A.' 
Lo-Cred x 69.11 71.89 SD 18.24 17.84 
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A score of 0 represents an attitudinal position completely discrepant 
from that advocated by the experimental communication while a score of 
100 represents a position in complete agreement with th~t of the message. 
Table 2 presents the attitude change scores for these same cells. 
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Table 2 
Graphic rating scale 
Means and standard deviations of the 
Absolute Attitude Change Scores 
for each of the eight treatment cellsa 
Hi-Cred x 110.85 SD 15.61 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 110.41 SD 22.19 
Syllogistic 
Hi-Cred x 105.11 SD 12.89 
Author-Drawn .. 
Lo:..cred x 102.15 SD 8.46 
Hi-Cred x 109.89 SD 17.85 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 101.59 SD 9.12 
Discursive 
Hi-Cred x 103. 77 SD 12. 71 
Author-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 102.74 SD 6.22 
aThese scores refle~t a constant of 100 added to all absolute scores 
to eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values. 
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To compute this measure each S's pretest score was subtracted from his 
posttest score to yield an attitude change measure with a possible range 
of from -100 to +100 •. A positive score indicates change in a directopm 
consistent with that advocated in this study. 
Table 3 is the ANOVA summacy table for this· attitude 
change data. 
• 
Source 
Program (P) 
Conclusion-Drawing 
Source Credibility 
p x c 
p x s 
c x s 
p x c x s 
Error 
Total 
*.E_(,05 
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Table '3 
Graphic rating scale 
ANOVA summary table: 
Absolute attitude change scores 
df SS MS 
1 373.41 373.41 
(C) 1 1213.63 1213.63 
(S) 1 547.85 547.85 
1 275.63 275.63 
1 11.8.52 118. 52 
1 75.85 75.85 
1 322.67 322.67 
208 46699.04 224.51 
215 49626.59 
F 
1. 66 
5.41* 
2.44 
1.23 
<'.:1 
~1 
1.44 
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It can be noted that only one main effect, that of Conclusion-Drawing 
was significant (! = 5.41, df = 1, 208, E.<.05), indicating that self-
drawing of conclusions resulted in greater attitude change than when·. 
conclusions were drawn for the Ss. There were no siSnificant inter-
actions. 
Semantic Differential Scale. Table 4 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the pre and posttest attitude ratings for each of the 
experimental cells as evaluated by the Semantic Differential Scale. 
On this scale also a score of 0 represents an attitudinal position maxi-
mally discrepant from that advocated in the study while a score of 126 
represents an attitudinal position maximally congruent with that of 
• 
the advocated message. 
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Table 4 
Semantic Differential Scale 
Pre- and posttest means and standard deviations 
Pre Post 
Hi-Cred x 98.19 102~33:: SD 12.88 12. 21-
Self-Drawn -
Lo-Cred x 96.15 99.26 SD 12.98 19.35 
Syllogistic 
Hi-Cred x 91.85 94.78 SD 16.00 19.27 
Author-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 91.07 94.48 SD 16.51 16.36 
-
Hi-Cred x 91.00 93.78 SD 16.06 17. 58. 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 99.81 99.11 SD 16.37 19.27 
Discursive 
Hi-Cred x 92.56 29.15 SD .. :·;. '14. 32 15.76 
Author-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 93.48 91.11 SD 16.52 19.38 
' 
26 
Table 5 presents the attitude change scores for these same cells. Com-
putation of these measures was identical to that for the Graphic Rating 
Scale. The possible range of scores, however, varies from -126 to 
+126 with a negative score indic~ting the boomarange effect • 
• 
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Table 5 
S~mantic Differential Scale 
Means and standard deviations of the 
absolute attitude change scores 
for each of the eight treatment cellsa 
Hi-Cred x 104.15 SD 13.41 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 103.19 SD 13. 71 
Syllogistic 
Hi-Cred x 102.43 SD 9.36 
Author-Drawn 
• x 103.41 Lo-Cred SD 7.97 
x 102.78 Hi-Cred SD 7.78 
Self-Drawn 
x 99.30 Lo-Cred SD 7.13 
Discursive 
x 971.160 Hi-Cred SD 7.60 
Author-Drawn 
x 97.63 Lo-Cred SD 8.42 
aThese scores reflect a constant of 100 added to all change scores to 
eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values. 
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Table 6 is the ANOVA summary table for this attitude change data. The 
main effect of Programs was significant at the .01 level (F = 7.08, 
df = 1, 208, .E_~Ol), indicating that the syllogistic message was 
superior to the discursive in eliciting attitude change. No other effect~ 
main or interactional, were evident: 
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Table 6 
Semantic Differential Scale 
ANOVA summary table 
Absolute attitude change scores 
Source df SS ¥S F 
Program (P) 1 696.96 696.96 7.08** 
lJ 
Conclusion-Drawing (C) 1 115.57 115.57 1.17 
Source Credibility (S) 1 118. 52 118. 52 1. 20 
p x c 1 50.07 . 50.07 .(1 
p x s 1 
• 
83.13 83.13 <1 
c x s L 29.63 29.63 ~1 
PxCxS. 1 .02 .02 ~1 
Error 208 20~86.96 98.50 
Total 215 21580.87 
**12.<·0l 
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While the findings of a Conclusion-Drawing main effect on the 
Graphic Rating Scale, and of a Program main effect on the Semantic 
Differential Scale are entirely consistent with the hypotheses of 
this study, a closer inspection of the data suggested a method of 
analysis which might provide a stronger test of the hypotheses. A 
tally of pretest scores on the Graphic Rating Scale indicated that treat-
ment cells varied from 3 to 14 in the number of ~s who had pretest scores 
of 90 and above, thus leaving little or no room for any attitude change 
to emerge at all. On the Semantic Differential Scale the number of Ss 
with scores of 110 and above varied from 1 to 6. These pretest cell 
differences, it was reasoned, might .have effectively interferred with 
the results by limiting (or increasing). the amount of attitude change 
that might have resulted had the scale ceiling been higher. Thus it 
was decided to reanalyze the data using as the dependent measure the 
percent of change obtained relative to the amount of change possible. 
In effect this measure "neutralizes" the effects of differing pretest 
cell arrays by simply considering the percent of possible change actually 
elicited. 
Graphic Rating Scale. To compute these percent scores for the 
Graphic Rating Scale each ~'s pretest score was subtracted from 100 
(the highest score attainable). This provided a measure of the total 
change possible for that ~· Each pretest score was then subtracted from 
the posttest score for the same ~ to yield a measure of the total 
absolute change elicited. This second measure was then divided by the 
.first to yield an index of the percent of actual change elicited relative 
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to the amount possible. I Table 7 presents the means and standard deviations 
of these change indices. Table 8 is the ANOVA summary table for 
this data. 
" 
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Table 7 
Graphic Rating Scale 
Means and .standard deviations of the 
percent attitude change score.s 
for each of the eight treatment cellsa 
x 1.39 Hi-Cred SD .23 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 1.28 SD .42 
Syllogistic 
I x 1.18 Hi-Cred SD .33 
Author-Drawn .. 
Lo-Cred x. 1.07 SD .23 
Hi-Cred x 1.24 SD .33 
Self-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x 1.11 SD .28 
Discursive 
Hi-Cred x 1.23 SD .38 
Author-Drawn 
Lo-Cred x·; 1.13 SD .25 
aThese scores reflect a constant of 1.00 added to all percent scores 
to eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values. 
Source 
Program (P) 
Conclusion-Drawing 
source Credibility 
p x c 
p x s 
c x s 
PxCxS' 
Error 
Total 
. **£. .(. 01 
*.E..<· 05 
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Table 8 
Graphic Rating Scale 
ANOVA sununary table: 
Percent attitude change scores 
df SS 
1 .1380 
(C} ,1 .6089 
(S} 1 .6825 
1 .6052 
l' .0006 
1 .0044 
• 
1 .0044 
208 20.9556 
215 22.9997 
MS F 
.1380 1.34 
.6089 6.04* 
.6825 6. 77** 
.6052 6.01* 
.0006 ~l 
.0044 ~1 
.0044 ~l 
.1077 
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Reanalyzing the data in this manner, again using a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of 
variance, there emerged two significant main effects, those of Conclusion-
Drawing (!, = 60.4, df = 1, 208,_J.~.15) and of Source Credibility 
(!. = 6.78, df = 1, 208, £~91). The first of these main effects indi-
cates, again, that the self-drawing of conclusions led to greater atti-
tude change than author-drawing. The second represents a superiority 
of a high credible source over a low credible source in eliciting attitude 
change. The Program x Conclusion-Dra~ing interaction was also signi-
ficant (!. = 6.01, df = 1, 208, £(.05). By Duncan Multiple Range 
Comparisons it was substantiated that the Syllogistic - Self-Drawn cell 
emerged as. significantly higher (p_(.01, df = 208) in the amount of attitude 
change elicited than any other cell. Although the Syllogistic -
Author-Drawn cell was considerably lower than either of the Discursive 
Program cells, these th~ee did not differ significantly from one 
another. 
This interaction indicates that the syllogistic communication 
is greatly influenced by whether or not ~s are required to draw their 
own conclusions. Thus, when this opportunity is available the effec-
tiveness of the syllogistic program was significantly greater than that 
of the Discursive Program, Self-Drawn or Author-Drawn. Yet when this 
opportunity was not available syllogistic superiority was greatly 
reduced. With a Discursive Program, however, the factor of conclusion-
drawing had little effect. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant. 
Semantic Differential S.cale. The computation of the percent change 
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indices for the Semantic Differential Scale was identical to that for 
the Graphic Rating Scale, :although the measure of total change possible 
was determined by subtracting each pretest score from 126 (the highest 
score attainable on this scale). Table 9 presents the means and standard 
deviations for these change indices. Table 10 is the ANOVA summary 
table for this data. 
• 
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Table 9 
Semantic Differential Scale: 
Means and standard deviations of the 
Percent attitude change scores 
for each of the eight treatment cellsa 
x 1.17 
Hi-Cred ' SD .31 
Self-Drawn 
x 1. 20 
Lo-Cred SD • 34 
Syllogistic 
x 1.14 
Hi-Cred SD .24 
Author-Drawn • 
·x 1.13 
Lo-'Cred SD .19 
x 1.12 
Hi-Cred SD .21 
Self-Drawn 
x 1.09 
Lo-Cred SD .26 
Discursive 
x 1.05 
Hi-Cred 
· SD .14 
Author-Drawn 
x 1.05 
Lo-Cred SD .18 
aThese scores reflect a constant of 1.00 added to all percent 
scores to eliminate, for computational purposes, all negative values. 
r ________________________________________ ..., 
-
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Semantic Differential Scale: 
ANOVA summary table: 
Percent attitude change scores 
Source df SS MS F 
Programs (P) 1 ~3769 .3769 6.21* 
Conclusion-Drawing (C) 1 .1530 .1530 2.52 
Source Credibility (S) 1 • 0005 .0005 . ~1 
p x c 1 .0022 .0022 <1 
p x s 1 .0044 .0044 <:'.1 
c x s 1 • .0008 .0008 ~1 
p x c x s 1 .0137 .0137 ~1 
Error 208 12.6282 .0607 
Total 215 13.1797 
*.E.-G 05 
r 
--------------------------------------------------------. 
38 
Again, as with the original change measures, the Program main effect 
was significant (F = 6.21, df = 1, 208, .E..<'.OS) in the direction of 
syllogistic superiority over that of a Discursive message. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant. 
Incidental Analyses. In addition the analyses of variance two further 
analyses were computed. The first of these was a chi-square analysis 
of the number of .§_s in the Conclusion-Drawing groups (Self-Drawn) 
who actually arrived at the correct conclusion to the counter-
attitudinal communication. Since the hypotheses of this study 
rest upon the theory that it is in the learning of the arguments 
leading up to the conclusions , and hot the learning of the 
conclusions per ~ that differentiates the Syllogistic from the 
Discursive conditions there should theoretically be no difference 
between these groups in the learning of the conclusion itself. Data 
is available from this experiment to test this hypothesis within 
those treatment groups in which Ss were asked to write in their own 
conclusions. Results of this chi-square analysis indicate no signi-
ficant differences in the number of ~s arriving at the correct conclusion 
between Syllogistic and Discursive conditions Cl2,,. .7623, df = 208. ns): 
Finally, Pearson Product Moment Correlations were computed between 
scores on the Graphic Rating Scale and the S.emantic Differential Scale. 
On pretest scores this correlation was +.62 while on posttest scores 
the correlation was +.65. There is no significant difference between 
these two correlations. However, when the posttest correlations were 
broken down by treatment group the results indicated some interesting 
39 
trends which will be discussed later. Table 11 presents these 
correlations. 
Syllog. 
Discur. 
Table 11 
Posttreatment Correlations between the 
Graphi.c Rating Scale and the Semantic Differential Scale 
for each of the eight treatment cells 
Self-Draw 
Hi-Cred Lo-Ored 
.25 
,80 
.60 
• 79 
• 
Author-Draw 
Hi-Cred 
.67 
.68 
Lo-Cred 
• 72 
.60 
40 
Chapter IV 
Discussion 
Taken together, the results of this investigation provide reasonable 
support for several of the research hypotheses of this study _while failing 
to support, or only tentatively supporting, two others. 
Graphic Rating Scale. The basic working hypothesis of this st~dy 
is that, owing to its provisions for more ideal learning conditions, 
the Syllogistic program will be superior to the Discursive program 
in eliciting attitude change. As measured by the Graphic Rating Scale 
this nypothesis was not supported. •However, reanalyzing the data using 
the percent attitude change indices the predicted frogram x Conclusion-
Drawing interaction emerged significantly. The means for this interaction 
suggest that a syllogistic message is far superior to any other Program 
X Conclusion-drawing condition when §_s were asked to provide their own 
conclusions. The Syllogistic - Self-Drawn cell elicited greater than 
30% more attitude change than any other cell. When the opportunity 
for conclusion-drawing is absent, however, this program elicited 10% 
less change than did the next less effective cell, indicating that the 
factor of conclusion-drawing is crucial to the effectiveness of a 
Syllogistic program. That it was not' simply· due to a greater incidence 
of correct-conclusion knowledge by the Ss in the Syllogistic conditions is 
supported by the Syllogistic versus Discursive chi-square analysis. 
Both Syllogistic and Discursive §_s did, in fac t, know the correct 
conclusion. It was in the acceptance of this conclusion owing to 
F·~-------------------------------------------------.. -
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a better learning of the supportive arguments that the Syllogistic 
program was more effective. 
The great dependence of the Syllogi~tic program on reinforcement 
might explain the lack of a main Program effect since without reinforceme~t 
its effectiv eness is reduced over even that of a Discursive program. 
The 42% difference in.the amount of attitude change between the Syllo-
gistic - Self-Drawn and the Syllogistic - Author-Drawn cells, coupled 
with the great inferiority of the Syllogistic - Author-Drawn over the 
Discursive program, Self-Drawn or Author-Drawn, also seems to indicate 
that syllogistic superiority as a function of judicious stimuli arrange-
ment is a relatively minor concern. It: appears as though stimuli 
• 
arrangement merely provides conditions within which the reinforcement 
factor may operate, such that alone it is ineffective. However, coupled 
with reinforcement, this cell provides for significantly greater attitude 
change than reinforcement alone, which in turn provides for greater 
change than does any non-reinforcement condition. 
The second major hypothesis of this study is that conclusion-
drawing by the E_s will result in greater attitude change than if the 
conclusions are immediately provided by the written communication (Aut~cr-
Drawn). As measured by the Graphic Rating Scale this hypothesis is 
strongly supported using both the absolute change scores and 'the percent 
change scores. Although it cannot be stated with certainty tha·t this 
finding reflects a superiority in learning owing to superior reinforcement 
contingencies, the finding of.a significant Program x Conclusion-Drawing 
interaction does lend considerable support to this interpretation since 
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it is in the Syllogistic Program that the effects of reinforcement are 
the more cogently taken advantage of. 
Source Credibility. A.!_ test on the· credibility ratings of the two 
fictitious sources used provides unqualified support for the contention 
that the credibility manipulation itself was successful (t = 20.03, 
df = 214, .£. =i.Ol) indicating that the High Credibility Source was, 
indeed, perceived as more credible than was the Low: .. Credible Source. 
Yet a surprising finding from this study is that the credibility manipu-
lation did not succeed in altering attitude change using absolute change 
scores as the dependent measure. As this finding is widely discrepant 
• from an enormous body of prior research stemming out of the Hovland, 
Janis and Kelley (1953) school it serves to increase confidence in tqe 
contention that there were possible abnormalities in the pretest data. 
This, in turn, serves to further justify the use of percent attitude 
change scores. Using these indices, moreover, the credibility effect 
emerges as highly significant. This result is interpreted as supporting 
the hypothesis that source credibility is an important factor in providing 
for message acceptance, and hence, attitude change. 
The failure to find the hypothesized Source x Program interaction 
may reflect the fact that the Syllogistic program is effective only 
under conditions of program reinforcement (cf., the Program x Conclusion-
Drawing interaction). Thus considering the Syllogistic program over both 
reinforcement conditions may have served to suppress any Program x 
Credibility interaction that may have emerged. The fact that the Program 
main effect was nonsignificant serves to lerid a certain degree of 
----------------------------~----~~-----------------------------------.... 
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confidence to this explanation. 
Semantic Differential Scale. As measured by the Semantic Differential 
Scale the only finding to emerge significantly was that.of the Syllo-
gistic versus Discursive·program. The Syllogistic program here was 
significantly more effective in eliciting attitude change. It is here 
again especially surprising that source credibility was non-influencial, 
and this lack of significance obtained both. under absolute and percent 
attitude change measures. 
This lack of support for an obvious prediction, and its contra-
diction to the Hovland, et al (1953) research leads to some interesting 
speculation. • 
It is highly likely tha- the Semantic D.ifferential Scale, having' been 
designed specifically to measure affective change, is too narrow in 
scope, hence too insensitive, to many of the variables that might be 
relevant to attitude change. If this is so·, then, only if Consistency 
Theory is correct would a change in any of these variables be expected 
to result in attitude change as measured by the Semantic Differential 
Scale. If, however, affective change does not automatically occur as 
a consequence of cogni.tive change (Le., if the. Consistency Theory 
formulation is too wide-swee~ing), then the manipulation of those 
variables re.lated to cognit:lve, i.e., bel:lef acceptance, would not be 
expected to manifest themselves as affective-scale changes. If it 
' 
can be assumed that source ceedibi~ity is, in fact, relevant to beli.ef-
acceptance, and this seems a reasonable assumption, then tha results of 
this study provide support for this reasoning. And thus, this study 
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might be interpreted as providing negative support for a Consistency 
hypothesis, since the manipulation of a more-properly cognitive factor 
succeeded in affecting the amount of attitude change as measured by 
a cognitive-oriented scale, and tlid not succeed in affecting ratings 
on the affect-specific scale. 
In exploring this reasoning further it is suggested that if it 
is attitude change, and not attitude-component change that is being 
evaluated, then if Syllogistic superiority is, in fact, based upon 
more effective Program-learning then any scale designed to evaluate 
attitudes should provide a reasonable measure of attitude change, 
regardless of which "component" or cGlmbination of atittudinal "com-
ponents" the scale is designed to measure. If, however, its superiority 
is due chiefly to some other factor, i.e., its more stark presentation 
of the program conclusion (a cognitive manipulation only in this case, 
and roughly analogous to Rosenberg and Abelson's (1960) affective 
manipulation via hypnosis), then a scale designed to measure affectave 
change alone (i.e., the Semantic Differential Scale) would be relatively 
insensitive to the Program manipulation unless the Consistency Theory 
claim is valid (i.e., that there is some basic tendency or drive towards 
cognitive-affective consistency). 
A Discursive communication, on the other hand, would be heavily 
reliant upon a broad measure of attitudes, and hence attitude change. 
This is because its reduced effectiveness would require a measurement 
scale sensitive to various attitudinal components in order for change 
to be measurable. A scale too selective in scope (i.e•, the Semantic 
'------------------------------------------------, 
~ 
.....-
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Differential Scale) might easily reduce the possibility of change being 
detected. And, in fact, the results of this study support this post hoc 
reasoning also. Changing the emphasis from Syllogistic superiority to 
Discursive inferiority, then it may be that the Discurs~ve Program was 
so ineffective as to result in no change on the highly selective Semantic 
Differential Scale. Thus, the Syllogistic Program emerged as 
significantly more effective. On the broader measurement scale, 
however, the Graphic Rating Scale was sensitive to more of those variables 
which might influence attitude change, and hence, more sensitive to 
changes as a result of the Discursive as well as the Syllogistic Program. 
The lack of significance on the GRS ~etween these two Programs might 
reflect this increased sensitivity of the Graphic Rating Scale. 
In attempting to support this reasoning with further empirical 
evidence correlation coefficients were obtained between the Graphic 
Rating Scale and the Semantic Differential Scale evaluations by each S. 
These results were presented in Table 11. On the basis of this study 
it can be assumed that reinforcement is a more influencial variable in 
attitude change than is source credibility. In fact, taking the study 
as a whole, source credibility is a somewhat negligible consideration. 
Thus, rank ordering the treatmen~ groups for each Program condition on 
the basis of their ability to provide maximum attitude change to occur 
the following trends emerged. As conditions decrease for the effectiveness· 
of the Syllogistic Program, the consistency increases between the 
more general attitudinal measuring device (the Graphic Ratiftg Scale) 
and the more specific affective measuring scale. As conditions decrease 
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for Discursive effectiveness, on the other hand, this "cognitive-
affective" consistency ·decreases. This finding may be interpreted as 
supporting the contention that a Syllogistic program is highly effective 
in inducing attitude change and, in fact, casts its influence on 
general attitude change (or perhaps cognitive change) as opposed to 
affective change alone. A Consistency prediction would have been that 
there should be no such correlational trends· evident. Conversely, 
however, the greater the possibility for Discursive effectiveness the 
less becomes the consistency between the GRS and the SDS. While this 
is entirely consistent with Balance. Theory the fact remains that the 
Discursive Program as a whole was less effective than was the Syllo-
gistic Program, and thus, the support for Consistency Theory is somewhat 
mitigated. Another way of looking at this is that the better the con-
ditions for attitude change to occur the less is the relevance that the 
Balance Principle holds. What may be happening is that traditional 
attitude change research failed to take advantage of maximum attitude 
change conditions (i.e., the use of Discursive rather than Syllogistic+ 
Reinforcement Programs), and thus did not recognize the relationship 
between what looks like a consistency drive and a continuum of attitude 
change conditions ranging from "poor conditions for" to "good conditions 
for" attitude change. And the consistency drive, itself, may be nothing 
more than a reflection of confounded variable manipulation owing to 
the ambiguity over just what the Discursive communication actually 
does manipulate. 
Although this study does not. incorporate a direct test of this 
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reasoning it is felt that the. supportive evidence.- is. strong enough_ to 
warrant further research along these lines. The t"act that the S~llo­
gistic approach to attitude cliange has not been conaide~ed prior to thi,s 
paper, and the interesting results of th1s study, certain!~- justify 
further research. However, there are certain difficultiea in F,ein:f;orce1Jlent 
interpretation which require a more refined formulation before further 
research is undertaken. 
Rosenberg (1960) presents persuasive evidence for a balance tendency. 
Having altered the affective component of an attitude through hypnosis 
it was observed that a certain cognitive reorganization did occur such 
that beliefs came to b~ consistent tlith the newly changed affect. This 
research provides perhaps the purest test of.Consistency Theory if it can 
be assumed, that the hypnotically-induced affective change was, in fact, 
just that. That these findings, then, are contradictory to those of 
the present study are, at this time, irreconcilable. Yet perhaps with 
further research on Syllogistic attitude cha~ge and a refinement of 
the procedure used such differences can be explained. 
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Appendix I 
Graphic Rating Scale 
Please indicate your own opinion of the'truth of the following statement 
by drawing a line through the scale at the point where you feel the 
probability of its truth lies. For example, given the statement: 
Poverty leads to hunger 
you would draw a line through the scale at a place pretty similar to 
where it is drawn in this example: i.e., 
·o 
very 
untrue 
10 20 30 40 50 
Now, do the following one yourself: 
60 70 80 90 
• 
Statement: With regard to space resea.rch, the United States and 
Russia should pool all of their talents and resources. 
0 
very 
untrue 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
I r loo 
very 
true 
100 
very 
true 
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Appendix II 
Abridged Semantic Differential Scale 
Please rate the following statement on each of the scales listed below. 
We realize that some of the scales might not seem appropriate to you, 
but do the best that you can in terms of your own opinions. 
Statement: With regard to space research, the United States and Russia 
should pool all of their talents and resources. 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 . 5 6 7 
bad good 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4. 5 6 7 
cruel kind 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ungrateful grateful 
I I ·l I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ugly beautiful 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
unsuccessful successful 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
false true. 
~--{. I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
disreputable reputable 
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- I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
soft hard 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
weak strong 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
lenient severe 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
light heavy 
I I I I • I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
passive active 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
drunk sober 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
insane sane 
I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
rounded angular 
I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
old new 
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I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
tasteless savory 
1 I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
defensive aggressive 
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Appendix I II 
High Credibility Source Biography 
Dr. Harold R. Cullan, Ph.D., the author of the passage you are 
about to read, is current Chairman -Director of CISA, the Council 
on International Scientific Achievement. This council, now including 
42 scientists from seven countries, was established'in 1962 by a group 
of Soviet and American scientists committed to the potential of scien-
tific inquiry in the area of space research within an atmosphere free 
of political pressures. The Council has since been recognized as the 
official policy-recommending organ of those countries involved. 
Before assuming the Directorate of CISA by elective vote in 1965, 
Dr. Cullan served as Chief Staff Consultant to the International Associ-
ation for Aerospace Research during which time he was decorated for his 
" outstanding contribution to aeronautical safety engineering 
through applied research." 
Dr. Cullan received his Ph.D. from MIT, summa cum laude, in 1953, 
and accepted a research post at the Institute for Aeronautical Engineering 
where he conducted most of his research prior to his involvement in · 
international research policy. The passage you are about to read is 
the basic syllogistic core of [for discursive conditions, "an exerpt 
from"] the report submitted by Dr. Cullan in 1967 to the various aerospace 
agencies of the participating CISA countries. 
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Appendix IV 
Low Credibility Source Biography 
Harold R. Cullan, the author of the passage you are about to read, 
is currently enrolled in a Chicago "parental" high school for operating 
what was later exposed as a "fixed" sports lottery. It was estimated 
that he had _earned over $700.00 from this racket before it was exposed. 
The passage you are about to read is the basic syllogistic core 
of [for discursive conditions, "an exerpt from"] a speech delivered as 
an assignment for his Speech course. His assignment was to try and 
convince the audience of' any point of view he selected. Each "team" 
was given one day in which to prepare his arguments; and he would be 
graded solely on the basis of how convincing his arguments were. 
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Appendix'V 
Credibility Manipulation Check 
Place a check mark ( ) in one of the spaces on each of the two 
scales below. 
1. How competent or expert do you feel the author is in preparing a 
message directly related to the ideal operating relationship 
between U.S. and Soviet space scientists? 
~'~-'---'---'--~'---'--~'--~'---'----~'--~'~/ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
none expert 
• 
2. How honest or truthful do you feel this author is.in delivering this 
message which is directly related to the operating relationship 
between U.S. and Soviet space scientists? 
~'--~'--~'---'--~'-,--'--~l--~/ ___ 1 ____ ~1_,,_~1---,--1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
none complete 
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Appendix VI 
Syllogistic Program: 
Self-Draw Condition 
On the following pages you will.read the message given by H. R. 
Cullan. For the sake of clarity his statements are arranged in the 
form of syllogisms. Each page will contain the two syllogistic 
premises. Your task is to read these premises anG·to write in the 
conclusion which follows from those premises. When you have finished 
reading and concluding all of the syllogisms you will have read his 
message. All of the syllogisms you will read and conclude follow 
the format: 
Premise 1: 
Premise 2: 
Conclusion: 
A leads to B 
B leads to C 
A leads to C 
Thus, for example, given the premises> 
Poverty leads to hunger: 
Hunger leads to illness: the conclusion which follows from these is 
Poverty leads to illness. 
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Please write in the conclusion to each of the syllogisms on the follow-
ing pages. After you have written in your conclusion, turn the page 
to read the correct conclusion. 
The highest purpose in life for man is the full realization of his 
human potential 
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding 
of his role in the Universe. 
59 
Therefore: the highest purpose in life for man lies in his understanding 
of his role in the Universe. 
60 
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding 
of his role in the Universe. 
Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent, 
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation. 
61 
Therefore: the full realization of man's human potential is, to a 
large extent, dependent upon methods of scientific investi-
gation. 
62 
Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent, 
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation. 
Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentally strategies 
in problem-solving. 
63 
Therefore: man's understanding of his role in the Universe relies most 
fundamentally on strategies in problem-solving. 
64 
Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentally strategies 
in problem-solving. 
Strategies in problem-solving require the maximization of cooperation 
if they are to be maximally efficient. 
65 
Therefore: methods of scientific investigation require the maximization 
of cooperation if they are to be maximally efficient. 
66 
Strategies in problem-solving require the maximization of cooperation 
if they are to be maximally efficient. 
The maximization of cooperation requires the unselfish pooling of all 
available talents and resources. 
67 
Therefore: strategies in problem-solving require the unselfish pooling 
,of all available talents and resources. 
68 
The interests of national security require a spirit of benevolence 
between nations. 
A spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if .there 
is an understanding between nations. 
69 
Therefore: the interests of national security require that th~re be 
an understanding between nations. 
70 
The spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if there 
is an understanding between nations. 
An understanding between nations is best served through mutual 
interaction. 
71 
Therefore: the spirit of benevolence between nations is best served 
through mutual interaction. 
72 
An understanding between nations is best served through mutual 
interaction. 
Mutual interaction is maximized through cooperative endeavors with 
common goals, 
73 
Mutual interaction is maximized through cooperative endeavors with 
common goals. 
Cooperative endeavors with common goals are successful only to the 
extent that there is a pooling of available resources and talents. 
74 
The final conclusion to the entire line of argument, then, is that: 
With regard to space research, those countries involved in such 
research should 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
The final conclusion to the entire line of argument, then, is that: 
With regard to space research, those countries involved in such research 
should pool all of their talents and resources in order to achieve 
I international scientific goals. 
,I 
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Appendix VII 
Syllogistic Program: 
Author-Draw Condition 
On the following pages you will read the message given by 
H. R. Cullan. For the sake of clarity his statements are arranged in 
the form of syllogisms. Each page will contain the two premises and 
the conclusion which follows from those premises, such that when 
you have finished reading all of the syllogisms you will have read 
his message. All of the syllogisms you will read follow the format: 
Premise 1: 
Premise 2: 
Conclusion: 
A leads to B 
B leads to C 
A leads to C 
Thus, for example, given the premises: 
Poverty leads to hunger: 
Hunger leads to illness: the conclusion which follows from these is 
Poverty leads to illness. 
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The highest purpose in life for man is the full realization of his 
human potential. 
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding 
of his role in the Universe. 
Therefore: the highest purpose in life for man lies in his understanding 
of his role in the Universe. 
The full realization of his human potential lies in man's understanding 
of his role in the Universe. 
Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent, 
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation. 
Therefore: the full realization of man's human potential is, to a 
large extent, dependent upon methods of scientific inves-
tigation. 
Man's understanding of his role in the Universe is, to a large extent, 
dependent upon methods of scientific investigation. 
Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentally strategies 
in problem-solving. 
Therefore: man's unders.tanding of his role in the Universe relies 
most fundamentally on strategies ::(n problem-solving. 
Methods of scientific investigation are most fundamentallr strategies-
in problem~solving. 
Strategies in problem-solving require the maxirofzation o~ cooperation 
if they are to be maximally efficient. 
Therefore: methods of scientific investigation req_uire the. 111axi'n)ization 
of cooperation if they are to oe maximally- efficient. 
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Strategies in problem-solving require the maximization of cooperation 
if they are to be maximally efficient. 
The maximization of cooperation requires the unselfish pooling of 
all available talents and resources. 
Therefore: strategies in problem~solving require the unselfish pooling 
of all available talents and resources. 
The interests of national security require a spirit of benevolence 
between nations. 
The spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if 
there is an understanding between nations. 
Therefore: the interests of national security require that there be 
an understanding between"l'lations. 
The spirit of benevolence between nations can only come about if there 
is an understanding between nations. 
An understanding between nations is best served through m~tual inter-
action. 
Therefore: the spirit of benevolence between nations is best served 
through mutual interaction. 
An understanding between nations is best served through mutual 
interaction. 
Mutual interaction is maximized through cooperative endeavors with 
common goals. 
Therefore: an understanding between nations is maximized through 
cooperative endeavors with common goals. 
80 
Mutual interaction is mzximized through cooperative endeavors with 
common goals. 
Cooperative endeavors with common goals are successful only to the 
extent that there is a pooling of available resources and talents. 
Therefore: mutual interaction is successful only to the extent that 
. there is a pooling of available resources and talents. 
With regard to space research, then, those countries involved in such 
research should pool all of their talents and resources in order to 
achieve international scientific goals. 
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Appendix VIII 
Discursive Program: 
Self-Draw Condition 
On the following page you will read the message given by H. R. 
Cullan. For the sake of clarity his message has been condensed although 
the essential points have not been changed. Please read the message 
carefuoly. When you have finished you will be asked to summarize the 
message and indicate the specific position taken by the author. 
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Appendix VIII 
Discursive Program: 
Self-Draw Condition 
Since the highest purpose in man's life is the full realization of 
his human potential it would follow that only to the extent that he 
realizes this potential can he achieve his ultimate purpose. Yet man 
requires an unde'rstanding of his role in the Universe for this to obtain, 
an understanding basea~on methods of scientific investigation using the 
best strategies available for this problem-solving process. It is 
largely through methods of scientific investigation based on such 
problem-solving strategies that man will be able to understand his unique 
role in the Universe. 
Now it has been shown in numerous scientific investigations that 
mutual cooperative interaction is the most efficient strategy for 
problem-solving tasks, and hence, for methods of scientific investi-
gation. And maximally cooperative p•oblem-solving strategies require 
a sharing not only of knowledge and abilities, but also of those talents 
and resources which are necessary for scientific investigation. 
As further evidence for this need for the maximization of coopera-
tive interaction in the problem-solving'process of scientific investi-
gation, it should be realized that maximum cooperative interaction will, 
because by definition it requires interpersonal interaction, endenger 
a spirit of benevolence between the cooperating nations. This is because 
such interaction towards a common goal lends itself to an increased 
mutual, understanding and thus to benevolence. And certainly it is 
unquestionable that a spirit of benevolence between nations would have 
the advantage of contributing to the interests of national security. 
Through cooperative sharing of resources and talents, then, the nations 
involved can come to a better understanding of one another, an understanding 
ofseommon goals, of ways of life, of feelings and attitudes, etc., all of 
which serve not only to increase man's understanding of his role in the 
Universe and of one another, but also which ease international conflicts, 
thus furthering the interests of national security. I: would maintain, 
in ::act, that a spirit of benevolence and an increased mutual under-
standing as a function of cooperation in the pooling of resources: and 
talents is one of the best ways of insuring a realization of human 
potential and human understanding since. such realization pe.rmi.ts problem ..... 
solving strategies unencumbered by selfish interests. 
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On this page write a brief summary of the arguments you have just 
read and specify exactly what the ultimate conclusion to the entire 
message is, according to its author. 
Summary: 
Specific Conclusion: 
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Appendix IX 
Discursive Program: 
Author-Draw Condition 
On the following page you wiil read the message given by H. R. 
Cullan. For the sake of clarity his message has been condensed although 
the essential points have not been changed. Please read the message 
carefully. When you have finished you will be asked some questions 
related to it. 
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Appendix IX 
Discursive Program: 
Author-Draw Condition 
Since the highest purpose in man's life is the full realization of 
his human potential it would follow that only to' the extent that he 
realizes this potential can he achieve his ultimate purpose. Yet man 
requires an understanding of his role in the Universe for this to obtain, 
an understanding based on methods of scientific investigation using the 
best strategies available for this problem-solving process. It is 
largely through methods of scientific investigation based on such 
problem-solving strategies that man will be able to understand his unique 
role in the Universe. 
Now it has been shown in numerous scientific investigations that 
mutual cooperative interaction is the most efficient strategy for 
problem-solving tasks, and hence, for methods of scientific investi-
gation. And maximally cooperative problem-solving strategies require 
a sharing not only of knowledge and abilities, but also of those talents 
and resources which are necessary fo~ scientific investigation. 
As further evidence for this need for the maximization of coopera-
tive interaction in the problem-solving process of scientific investi-
gation, it should be realized that maximum cooperative interaction will, 
because by definition it requires interpersonal interaction, engender 
a spirit of benevolence between the cooperating nations. This' is because 
such interaction towards a common goal lends itself to an increased 
mutual understanding and thus to benevolence. And certainly it is 
unquestionable that a spirit of benevolence between nations would have 
.the advantage of contributing to the interests of national security. 
Through cooperative sharing of resources and talents, then, the nations 
involved can come to a bettel'.~understanding of ane another, an understanding 
of common goals, of ways of life, of feelings and attitudes, etc., all of 
which serve not only to increase man's understanding of his role in the 
Universe and of one another, but also which ease international conflicts, 
thus furthering the interests of national security. r would maintain, 
in fact, that a spirit of benevolence and an increased mutual under-
standing as a function of cooperation in the pooling of resources and 
talents is one of the best ways of insuring a realization of liuman 
potential and human understanding since such realization permits problem-
solving strategies· unencumbered by selfish interests. 
In conclusion, then, I strongly recommend that our nations can 
maximize their understanding of their roles in the Universe throqgh 
a maximally· cooperative interaction involving the pooling of all talents 
and resources. Such cooperative pooling of resources and talents would 
certainly bring us closer to those scie:µtific goals- common to all ·nat:tons _, 
sharing man's attempt at understanding his role in the Universe. 
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